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Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs can be harmful. How is it possible to reduce them
effectively? Three reduction strategies were tested in an online experiment using general
and well-known CT beliefs on a comprehensive randomly assigned Hungarian sample
(N = 813): exposing rational counter CT arguments, ridiculing those who hold CT beliefs,
and empathizing with the targets of CT beliefs. Several relevant individual differences
were measured. Rational and ridiculing arguments were effective in reducing CT, whereas
empathizing with the targets of CTs had no effect. Individual differences played no role
in CT reduction, but the perceived intelligence and competence of the individual who
conveyed the CT belief-reduction information contributed to the success of the CT belief
reduction. Rational arguments targeting the link between the object of belief and its
characteristics appear to be an effective tool in fighting conspiracy theory beliefs.
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INTRODUCTION
The level of beliefs in conspiracy narratives differs among people. Conspiracy narratives claim that
powerful people or organizations cooperate in secret, to achieve sullen objectives by deceiving
the public (Abalakina-Paap and Stephan, 1999; Wood et al., 2012; Wood and Douglas, 2013).
According to 160 million Americans, there was a conspiracy behind JFK’s murder; today, 110
million people believe that global warming is a hoax; 18 million believe that Bin Laden is still
alive; and 12 and a half million believe that non-human beings, the so called Lizard people (they
are the reptilian elite controlling the world since ancient times) control politics (Williams, 2013).
Conspiracy theories are relevant for social interaction and democracy as they can induce anger,
lead to low political participation, and to learned helplessness. While some studies have shown
that inducing conspiracy theories is easy (Butler et al., 1995), to date, only a few researchers have
attempted to examine the possibility of reducing beliefs in conspiracy theories (Banas and Miller,
2013); there is no accumulated knowledge about effective methods of CT reduction. The present
study intends to fill this gap.
Despite theoretical diversity (see Krekó, 2015, for an overview), a few characteristics of CTs
appear to be consensual. First, CTs are associated with a mechanistic worldview covering the beliefs
that (a) nothing happens by chance; (b) nothing is what it seems; (c) everything interconnects with
everything (Barkun, 2003). Second, CTs are organically connected to each other and are likely to be
integrated in a lay conspiracy meta-theory of society (Goertzel, 1994). Although CTs are organically
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connected, they can be categorized on the basis of their scope:
(a) they can explain concrete events (e.g., JFK); (b) systematic
CTs cover a group’s attempt for hegemony; (c) super CTs
refer to a complex conspiracy worldview, including several
seemingly independent theories (Barkun, 2003). Third, CT’s
are characterized by a bipolar, black, and white logic, which
divides society into good and evil (Moscovici, 1987; Berlet, 2009).
Fourth, CTs resist rational arguments, because only the pieces of
information, which are consistent with them, are processed, the
incompatible ones being rejected (Bartlett and Miller, 2010). The
present study intends to challenge this latter characteristic of CTs
with an experimental study.
According to previous studies, individual differences appear
regarding beliefs in CTs. These individual differences can be
categorized into personality and attitudinal dimensions. Among
personality variables, belief in CTs is negatively related to self-
esteem (Abalakina-Paap and Stephan, 1999; Swami et al., 2011),
to agreeableness (Swami et al., 2011; Bruder et al., 2013), and to
conscientiousness among Big Five traits (Brotherton et al., 2013).
Based on attitudinal variables, beliefs in CTs are positively related
to feelings of powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap and Stephan, 1999;
Bruder et al., 2013), to perceived lack of control (Hamsher et al.,
1968; Whitson and Galinsky, 2008), to mistrust of other people
(Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap and Stephan, 1999; Brotherton
et al., 2013), and authorities (Swami et al., 2010), anomie
(Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap and Stephan, 1999; Brotherton
et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013), and authoritarianism (Goertzel,
1994; Abalakina-Paap and Stephan, 1999; Swami et al., 2011;
Bruder et al., 2013). The only demographic variable positively
related to beliefs in CTs was minority status (Goertzel, 1994;
Crocker et al., 1999). Nevertheless, these individual differences
were only weakly related to beliefs in CTs.
If conspiracy theories are associated with malevolent effects,
the question arises: How is it possible to change conspiracy
beliefs? According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), beliefs can
be defined as one’s subjective probability judgments related
to a given aspect of the perceived world. Beliefs contribute
to the understanding of oneself and depend on the person’s
environment. CTs are mainly inferential beliefs because they
go beyond the observable events and are derived from external
sources. These sources provide certain pieces of information; thus
they can be interpreted as informational beliefs. CTs, as other
beliefs, have an object (Jews, European Union, global financial
system, or bankers, etc.), which is related to a given attribute
(exploitative, hidden, and manipulative, etc.). The link between
the object and the attribute exists on a certain level, based on
subjective probability judgment.
Based on Fishbein and Ajzen’s conceptualization (Fishbein
and Ajzen, 1975), belief change refers to the modification of
subjective probability judgments. Based on the theory of planned
behavior1 (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), we assume that it is possible
1According to the theory of planned behavior, a behavior occurs more probably if
(a) the individual has a positive attitude toward, (b) has a sense of being able to
control the given behavior, and (c) the subjective norms support this particular
behavior. This combination of attitudes, beliefs, and subjective norms leads to
increased behavioral intention, which in turn results in higher probability of the
actual performance.
to change these probability judgments in three ways. First, it
is possible to (a) change the link between the object and the
attribute. Second, it is possible to (b) increase the distance
between the self and those who hold a relationship between the
object and the attribute. Third, it is possible to (c) manipulate
the level of identification between the object and the person
who holds a certain level of conspiracy belief toward the object.
All three of these strategies can be anchored to pre-existing
attitude change theoretical frameworks: the functional attitude
theories (Katz, 1960), the elaboration likelihood model with its
central and peripheral routes (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), and the
consistency theories (e.g., Abelson, 1968).
(a) In order to change the link between the object and the
attribute, further logical pieces of information or logical steps
can be provided, thus allowing us to elaborate on the logical
structure which can result in a more complex link. For example,
the object of the belief can be the banks, and the attribute
can be exploitative. A low level of elaboration lacks arguments
as to why this link exists, whereas a high level of elaboration
includes many logically compatible and underpinned arguments.
We hypothesize that pointing out the logical flaws of this link,
providing an elaborated explanation without logical flaws could
make one deconstruct the preexisting link and construct a new
one between the object and the attribute. This should lead to
belief changes. In the previous example, if we provide detailed
information about how much money banks get from taxpayers’
money, which is four times less than what they pay to the state in
many different special taxes in any given period of time, the link
becomes more elaborate in terms of complexity and coherence.
We assume that this can lead, to some extent, to belief change.
From the perspective of functional attitude theories (Katz, 1960),
rational arguments affect the knowledge function by providing
detailed information about the link between the object and the
attribute of the belief. This strategy can provide a deeper sense
of understanding and control over the particular conspiracy-
related part of the external world. From the perspective of the
elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), the
rational strategy is related to the central route of persuasion
in which an individual holding CT beliefs evaluates the pros
and cons of the rational arguments and estimates the fit of
these detailed arguments to the pre-existing value system. From
the perspective of inconsistency theories (Abelson, 1968), belief
rationalization in the three arguments present different forms
of inconsistency. Regarding those who hold CT beliefs, showing
data through rational arguments can create inconsistencies
between the informational content of the previous beliefs and
the new information regarding events or people related to the
conspiracies. This inconsistency can be reduced by challenging
the original conspiracy beliefs.
(b) The second possibility of conspiracy belief change involves
increasing the distance between the self and those who hold a
certain link between the object and the attribute. To achieve this,
one can demonstrate that those people who hold such beliefs
are characterized by negative traits or they are targeted as being
ridiculous. As practically no one wants to be ridiculed by others,
the ridiculing argument can be fueled by the ego-protective
function (Katz, 1960). For example, if one shows that people who
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believe that Osama Bin Laden is still alive, while also believing
that he was already dead before the US troops found him (see
Wood et al., 2012), they cannot be taken seriously. Nevertheless,
this is a part of CT beliefs and suggests that CT believers have
difficulties with logical thinking. In this case, an individual may
choose to increase the distance between the self and those who
hold a certain link between the object (mass media/Osama Bin
Laden) and the attribute (misleading/dead). If one considers the
elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), the
ridiculing method belongs to the peripheral routes. It is affected
by less deliberate processes either through building more positive
emotional bonds to the object of the beliefs or by increasing the
gap between the self and those who hold such beliefs as a result
of ridiculing arguments. Furthermore, we assume that those
individuals who have had prior conspiracy beliefs will experience
a certain level of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962; Aronson,
1969). The source of dissonance is the opposition between being
a logical person and the irrationality of CT believers. Ridiculing
arguments can create inconsistency as a result of social identity
issues, that is, that the individual does not want to belong to
a ridiculous group (Abelson, 1968). This dissonance can be
reduced through changing the CT beliefs; however, it also needs
to question (a) the assumption that CT believers are irrational,
as well as (b) the source of this information. As far as we know,
this self-distancing aspect of belief change has been relatively
poorly investigated in social psychology. However, there are some
successful belief change examples from recent history. One of
these is the reduction of the popularity of the Ku-Klux-Klan
(KKK): in the 1940’s Stetson Kennedy exposed many of the
KKK’s secret rituals (handshakes, passwords, and other ludicrous
behaviors) in a ridiculous manner. The consequences were
immediate, after 2 weeks, the recruitment of KKK plummeted
to zero. People did not want to join an organization because the
formerly terrifying shadow organization of white pride was now
regarded as laughable. Therefore, we presume that, in this case,
the belief change occurred as a result of distancing one’s self from
KKKmembers because of their pathetic and ridiculous practices.
(c) We suppose that the third form of conspiracy belief
change relates to the identification with the object of the belief.
Therefore, in this case, the primary goal is not to change the
link between the object and the attribute, but to focus on
the reduction of the distance between the self and the object
of the CT. For example, CTs concerning objects (e.g., Jews)
generally include negative attributes (e.g., secretly manipulative).
If, as a result of a message (e.g., claiming that Christians faced
similar conspiracy theories beforehand), people put ourselves
in the position of Jews, they can empathize more easily with
them, which can lead to more positive attitudes toward them.
These empathizing arguments can be related to value expressive
functions in terms of presenting an image that is in line with a
positive and caring self-concept (Katz, 1960). The empathizing
arguements do not necessarily directly influence the link between
the object (e.g., Jews) and the negative attribute (e.g., secretly
manipulative), but they can provide an alternative evaluative
dimension of the object, which can indirectly weaken the original
link. From the perspective of the elaboration likelihood model
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), contrary to the rational arguments,
the empathic ones are related to the peripheral route. On
the basis of the consistency theories (Abelson, 1968), empathy
creates inconsistency on the level of the target group of the
beliefs who have positive attributes besides the negative ones
that a conspiracy believer mostly associates with them. Finally,
since objects of CTs are generally prejudiced groups (e.g., Jews,
speculators, bankers, Chinese, or Lizard people), on the basis of
prejudice reduction research, empathy toward these groups can
reduce the negative prejudices which may lead to the CT belief
change (e.g., Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008; Berger et al., 2016).
The goal of the present study was to experimentally examine
the above-described three strategies of CT belief change in an
online setting on comprehensive samples. We expected that all
three strategies would effectively reduce CT beliefs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
This research employed a nationally representative probability
sample of 813 Hungarians, selected randomly from an Internet-
enabled panel, including 20,000 members, with the help of
the Solid Data Ltd., in October–November 2014. For the
preparation of the sample, a multiple-step, proportionally
stratified, probabilistic sampling method was employed.
Members of this panel used the Internet at least once a week.
The demographic characteristics of the panel are permanently
filtered. More specifically, individuals were removed from
the panel if they responded too quickly (i.e., without paying
attention to their response) and/or had fake (or not used) e-mail
addresses. The sample was nationally representative in terms
of gender, age, level of education, and location of residence.
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki and with the approval of the Institutional Review
Board of the Eötvös Loránd University. Before starting the
questionnaire, participants received information about the
study in terms of examining beliefs about how societies work.
Subsequently, participants read and approved the informed
consent.
Eight hundred and thirteen (813) individuals (50.8% female)
participated in the present online experiment, between the ages
of 18 and 75 (M = 45.7, SD = 15.04). Participants were
randomly assigned to the conditions, taking into account the
representativeness (age, gender, level of education, place of
residence). In the experimental conditions, participants listened
to the CTs instead of reading them. Only the participants,
who listened to the CTs and the audio recordings of the
experimental manipulations until the end, were selected. As a
result, 104 participants were excluded. The final sample consisted
of 709 participants (51.1% female), the average age was 46.43
(SD = 14.74), the age range being 18–75 years. Regarding the
places of residence, 209 (29.5%) respondents lived in the capital,
217 (30.6%) lived in county capitals, 138 (19.5%) lived in other
towns, and 145 (20.5%) lived in villages. Regarding the levels of
education, 120 (16.9%) respondents had only received primary
school education, 212 (29.9%) had a secondary level education,
377 (53.2%) had a higher level education, which implies that the
sample was better educated than the oﬄine population.
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Procedure
In the present study, participants were recruited via Internet.
After agreeing with the informed consent form, participants
listened to the first audio recording (for the transcript, see
Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material). This is a 4:30min
recording that presented a conspiracy super theory including
the victimization of Hungary by the financial imperium, the
hidden control of Jews over the world, the EU as a non-
functional oppressive power, and the bankers who exploit
the Hungarian financial system. The text provided vivid, but
confusing details about the mechanisms that “actually” shape
the fate of Hungary and the world. This super CT met the above
mentioned characteristics of CTs in terms of nothing happens by
chance, nothing is what it seems, everything is interconnected
with everything, and the world is divided into good
and evil.
Having listened to the recording, participants expressed their
acceptance concerning eight questions on the four main topics
(victimization of Hungary, EU, power of the Jews, bankers).
Then, they were asked about their general acceptance of the
listened CT. The final two questions referred to the perceived
competence and intelligence of the speaker who reported the CT.
After this questionnaire, participants were randomly assigned to
one of the four conditions. They listened to another speech with,
either rational (3:36min), ridiculing (3:28min), or empathetic
(2:54min) arguments against CTs. In the control condition
(3:15min), they listened to a weather forecast. The transcripts
of each condition can be seen in Appendix 2 in Supplementary
Material.
In the rational condition, the text tackled the claims made in
the first recording in a logically plausible manner, using numbers
to support the objections, and pointing out the discrepancy
between high influence and concealment. This speech pointed
out the logical flaws of the first speech and corrected it with in-
depth arguments regarding the link between the beliefs’ objects
and attributes. The goal of this condition was to emphasize
the logical inconsistencies and to create a more complex and
coherent relationship between the objects of the belief and the
attributes.
In the ridiculing condition, the script addressed the
same logical flaws, but reasoned against them differently:
instead of focusing on certain details, it derided the logical
inconsistencies and concentrated on those who believe in the
CTs, picturing them as evidently ridiculous (e.g., mentioning
the believers of Lizard Men). This text intended to increase the
distance between the respondents’ self and those who believe
in CTs.
The empathetic condition contested the original text’s claim
in a different manner: instead of focusing on content or those
who believe in the content, it placed the objects of the CTs in
the center, and compassionately called attention to the dangers of
demonizing and scapegoating, while also pointing out the human
character of the CT objects (i.e., Jews face similar conspiracy
theories and persecution nowadays that the Early Christians
faced). This condition intended to reduce the distance between
the respondent and the objects of CTs and to raise empathy
toward these groups.
In the control condition participants listened to a simple
weather forecast which was not related to the content of the
CT. After the recording, respondents answered the same 11
questions.
Measures
Conspiracy Assessment Tool (CAT)
An eight item scale was created specifically for the present
experiment to measure the individual’s attitudes toward
conspiracies, assessing beliefs regarding conspiracies related
to four aspects: (1) Hungary as a victim of conspiracy; (2)
Jews as the leaders of the world; (3) the European Union is a
parasitic formation without any function; and (4) the bankers
as the leaders of the world. These specific topics were related to
the CT audio they listened to previously. More precisely, they
referred to the key elements of the text regarding these four
topics. Respondents used an 11-point scale to indicate their
level of agreement (0, Strongly Disagree; 10, Strongly Agree).
This scale showed high levels of reliability with a Cronbach
alpha value of 0.95 for the pre-manipulation and 0.96 for the
post-manipulation.
In addition to the eight CAT items, one item measured
the listener’s level of agreement with the audio excerpts, using
the response options of the previous eight items. Finally, two
additional items were created: the first assessed the competence
of the speaker on an 11-point scale (0, Not competent at all;
10, Completely competent), while the second item assessed the
intelligence of the speaker on a 5-point scale (1, Far below
average; 5, Far above average).
Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ)
This 5-item measurement was developed by Bruder et al. (2013)
and was translated, by following Beaton et al.’s (2000) protocol.
Furthermore, six additional items reflecting on the Hungarian
societal context were added. The CMQ measures the tendency
to engage in conspiracy-related ideations (Cronbach α: 0.80).
Respondents used a 7-point scale for answering (1, Not true at
all; 7, Completely true).
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)
The 40-item BIDR (Paulhus, 1991) was administered to assess
social desirability. This measure contains two subscales (self-
deceptive positivity and image management), with 20 items
belonging to each. In the present study, internal consistency
indices were acceptable (Cronbach αself−deceptive enhancement: 0.71;
Cronbach αimpression management: 0.55). Respondents used a 7-
point scale for answering (1, Not true at all; 7, Completely
true).
Big Five (BFI)
Personality-related dimensions were assessed by the Big Five
thInventory (John and Srivastava, 1999). The BFI is a 45-
item scale that measures the personality of the respondent
according to five dimensions: extraversion (Cronbach α: 0.69),
agreeableness (Cronbach α: 0.62), conscientiousness (Cronbach
α: 0.62), emotional stability (Cronbach α: 0.74) and openness
(Cronbach α: 0.84). In this study, a shorter, valid version
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was used (Farkas and Orosz, 2013) that contained 15 items;
respondents used a 5-point scale to indicate their level of
agreement (1, Strongly disagree; 5, Strongly agree).
Demographic Variables
Participants were asked to indicate the following demographic
variables: age, gender (1, female; 2, male), place of residence
(1, capital; 2, county town; 3, town; 4, village), and level
of education (1, primary level education; 2, secondary level
education; 3, higher level education).
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics of the above-mentioned questionnaires
with ranges, summed scores, standard deviations, and
intercorrelations can be seen in Table 1 (see the Dataset
here). Individual differences in terms of Big Five traits and BIDR
dimensions were either unrelated to or very weakly related to
CAT scores. Only Openness and BIDR-SDE were negatively
and weakly related to CAT scores. Finally, CMQ and CAT were
highly associated with each other.
Measuring the Effectiveness of the Audio
Excerpts
No significant differences were found between the baseline (pre-
test) measures considering the four conditions (all p > 0.208).
The CONDITION ∗ TIME ANOVA predicting the change in
the extent of believing in conspiracy theories revealed significant
main effects of TIME, F(1, 705) = 32.49, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.04;
but not of CONDITION, F(1, 705) = 1.38, p = 0.249, ηp
2
=
0.01. The interaction of CONDITION ∗ TIME was significant,
F(3, 705) = 6.13, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.03. CAT scores did
not significantly differ between the groups at baseline (lowest
p = 0.21).
Paired-samples T-tests were conducted in order to investigate
the change in pre-test and post-test CAT scores over time. CAT
scores decreased significantly from pre-test to post-test among
participants who participated in the rational condition, t(171) =
4.32, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.13 (for means, see Figure 1). Also,
CAT scores decreased significantly from pre-test to post-test
among participants who participated in the ridiculing condition,
t(177) = 5.46, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.11. However, no
significant decrease was found from pre-test to post-test in the
other two conditions: empathetic, t(185) = 1.71, p = 0.090,
Cohen’s d = 0.05, control, t(172)=−0.28, p = 0.782, Cohen’s d =
0.01. Compared to the post-test scores of the control condition,
the rational condition had significantly lower post-test scores,
t(343) = 2.55, p = 0.011, Cohen’s d = 0.27, the ridiculing
condition tended to have lower scores, t(349) = 1.90, p = 0.059,
Cohen’s d = 0.20, and the empathetic condition’s mean was not
different, t(357) = 0.97, p = 0.333, Cohen’s d = 0.10.
These results suggest that the manipulation in the rational
and the ridiculing condition were successful. However, in the
empathetic condition the extent of believing in conspiracy
theories did not significantly decrease.
Measuring the Effect of Social Desirability
on the Manipulation
The CONDITION ∗ TIME ANCOVA controlling for BIDR-SE
predicting the change in the extent of believing in conspiracy
theories controlling for the self-deceptive enhancement factor
of social desirability revealed significant main effect of TIME,
F(1, 704) = 7.25, p = 0.007, ηp
2
= 0.01; and of BIDR-
SDE F(1, 704) = 4.53, p = 0.034, ηp
2
= 0.01; but did not
of CONDITION, F(3, 704) = 1.34, p = 0.262, ηp
2
= 0.01.
The interaction of CONDITION ∗ TIME remained significant,
F(3, 704) = 6.32, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.03, but the interaction of
TIME ∗ BIDR-SDE was only marginally significant, F(1, 704) =
3.79, p = 0.052, ηp
2
= 0.01. These results suggest that self-
deceptive enhancement had a direct effect on CAT scores, but it
had no significant effect on the interaction.
The CONDITION ∗ TIME ANCOVA controlling for BIDR-
IM predicting the change in the extent of believing in conspiracy
theories controlling for the impression management factor of
social desirability revealed significant main effect of TIME,
F(1, 704) = 6.30, p = 0.012, ηp
2
= 0.01; but did not of BIDR-
IM F(1, 704) = 1.53, p = 0.216, ηp
2
= 0.00; and did not
of CONDITION, F(3, 704) = 1.32, p = 0.268, ηp
2
= 0.01.
The interaction of CONDITION ∗ TIME remained significant,
F(3, 704) = 6.31, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.03, but the interaction
of TIME ∗ BIDR-IM was only marginally significant, F(1, 704) =
3.04, p = 0.082, ηp
2
= 0.004. These results suggest that
impression management did not have a direct effect on CAT
scores, nor did it have an effect on the interaction.
Measuring the Effect of the Perceived
Competency and Intelligence of the
Speaker on the Manipulation
The CONDITION ∗ TIME ANCOVA controlling for
COMPETENCY predicting the change in the extent of
believing in conspiracy theories controlling for the perceived
competency of the speaker revealed only marginally significant
main effect of TIME, F(1, 704) = 2.84, p = 0.093, ηp
2
= 0.004;
but did not of CONDITION F(3, 704) = 1.63, p = 0.180,
ηp
2
= 0.01; however, significant main effect was found of
COMPETENCY, F(1, 704) = 60.83, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.08.
The interaction of CONDITION ∗ TIME was significant,
F(3, 704) = 6.11, p = 0.025, ηp
2
= 0.03, but the interaction of
TIME ∗ COMPETENCY was not significant, F(1, 704) = 0.19,
p = 0.666, ηp
2
= 0.0003. These results suggest that the perceived
competency of the speaker had a direct effect on CAT scores, but
it had no significant effect on the interaction.
The CONDITION ∗ TIME ANCOVA controlling for
INTELLIGENCE predicting the change in the extent of believing
in conspiracy theories controlling for the perceived intelligence
of the speaker revealed no significant main effect of TIME,
F(1, 704) = 1.13, p = 0.289, η
2
p = 0.002; of CONDITION
F(3, 704) = 1.26, p = 0.288, η
2
p = 0.01; however, significant
main effect was found of INTELLIGENCE, F(1, 704) = 36.23,
p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.05. The interaction of CONDITION ∗ TIME
was significant, F(3, 704) = 6.13, p = 0.025, ηp
2
= 0.03, but
the interaction of TIME ∗ INTELLIGENCE was not significant,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1525
Orosz et al. Changing Conspiracy Beliefs
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and correlations of the included questionnaires (N = 709).
Scales Range Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Conspiracy Assessment Tool—pre 8–88 45.15 25.88 –
2. Conspiracy Assessment Tool—post 8–88 43.28 26.11 0.94** –
3. Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire 11–77 51.08 11.21 0.60** 0.61** –
4. Self-deception Enhancement factor of BIDR 20–140 92.13 12.46 −0.09* −0.07 0.02 –
5. Impression Management factor of BIDR 20–140 82.36 11.44 −0.06 −0.04 −0.01 0.29** –
6. Extraversion 3–15 10.62 2.67 −0.01 0.00 0.04 0.20** 0.04 –
7. Agreeableness 3–15 11.42 2.13 0.07 0.08* 0.11** 0.20** 0.20** 0.25** –
8. Conscientiousness 3–15 10.34 2.53 −0.01 −0.03 0.04 0.33** 0.34** 0.09* 0.14** –
9. Emotional stability 3–15 9.93 2.73 −0.05 −0.04 0.01 0.43** 0.12** 0.11** 0.32** 0.14** –
10. Openness 3–15 11.35 2.92 −0.13** −0.13** −0.05 0.17** 0.16** 0.16** 0.22** 0.11** 0.11**
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
F(1, 704) = 0.03, p = 0.868, ηp
2
= 0.00004. These results suggest
that the perceived intelligence of the speaker had a direct effect
on CAT scores, but it had no significant effect on the interaction.
Measuring the Effect of
Personality-Related Variables on the
Manipulation (ANCOVA)
Using Big Five traits as covariates in the CONDITION ∗ TIME
ANCOVAs did not show either the main effect or the interaction
of personality traits, except for Openness which had a significant
main effect, F(1, 704) = 12.48, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.02. These
results suggest that none of the personality traits had a direct
effect on CAT scores, and it had no significant effect on the
interaction.
Measuring the Effect of Level of Engaging
in Conspiracy-Related Ideations on the
Manipulation
The CONDITION ∗ TIME ANCOVA controlling for CMQ
predicting the change in the extent of believing in conspiracy
theories controlling for the level of engaging in conspiracy-
related ideations revealed significant main effects of TIME,
F(1, 704) = 9.40, p = 0.002, ηp
2
= 0.01; and of CMQ F(1, 704) =
859.87, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.55; but did not of CONDITION,
F(3, 704) = 0.22, p = 0.885, ηp
2
= 0.001. The interaction of
CONDITION ∗ TIME remained significant, F(3, 704) = 5.63,
p = 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.02; however, the interaction of TIME ∗ CMQ
was not significant, F(1, 704) = 3.58, p = 0.059, ηp
2
= 0.01.
These results suggest that the level of engaging in conspiracy-
related ideations had no significant effect on the results of the
experiment.
DISCUSSION
Most of the existing studies regarding the nature of conspiracy
theories are descriptive; moreover, experimental research
exploring the possibility of CT belief change is very rare (Banas
and Miller, 2013; Swami et al., 2014). In the present study, the
immediate effects of three types of belief change strategies on
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FIGURE 1 | Conspiracy Assessment Tool points before and after
listening to audio excerpt related to conspiracy theory reduction in
each condition.
conspiracy belief change were investigated on comprehensive
samples. According to the results, the empathetic arguments were
not very effective. However, ridiculing and rational arguments
were effective in CT belief change.
Previously, it was assumed that CTs resisted rational
arguments, because only those pieces of information that were
consistent with them were processed, while the incompatible
ones were rejected (Bartlett andMiller, 2010). The present results
are challenging this idea. CTs are characterized by a bipolar, black
and white logic, which divides the society into good and evil. The
success of the rational argument can be justified by the elaborated
processing of the logical link between the target and the attribute.
It is also possible that rational arguments can reduce CT beliefs
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by challenging the black and white thinking (Moscovici, 1987;
Berlet, 2009). In the case of the rational condition, the convincing
message aimed to elaborate the link between the objects (Jews,
European Union, global financial system or bankers) and the
attributes (exploitative, hidden, and manipulative). By pointing
out the logical flaws and inconsistencies of CTs, it aimed to
create a more complex and coherent link between the objects
and the attributes. These results are in line with Swami et al.’s
(2014) findings, according to which analytic thinking reduces
conspiracist ideation. Helping analytic thinking by providing
detailed explanations can reinforce deliberate processing of
information. Swami et al. (2014) used a more tacit form of
analytic thinking induction; nevertheless, on the basis of the
present results it might be similarly effective if the rational
arguments were directly given to the people. In both cases,
skepticism becomes stronger and individuals become less willing
to endorse those logical flaws, which are inherent parts of CT
beliefs. In the rational condition, participants were informed
about the logical flaws of the CT beliefs, but this speech did not
refer directly to the characteristics of CT believers. Therefore,
the stimulus of the rational condition was less threatening to
those participants who were CT believers than the ridiculing
condition, whichmight also contribute to the higher effectiveness
of these arguments. One more explanation for the results is
that it was not the rational arguments themselves, but the
“rationality heuristics” associated with the message (logically-
looking argumentation, many facts and numbers) that caused the
impact of this condition. An experimentum crucis examining the
two options should be done in order to be able to decide the real
cause of the impact.
In the ridiculing condition, the arguments focused on the
deficiencies of CT believers’ thinking. This belief change can
be expected as a result of the emerging distance between
the self and those who hold CT beliefs. Ridiculing arguments
are threatening for those who hold strong conspiracy beliefs,
but among those who do not have very strong CT beliefs it
can lead to disidentification from the group of CT believers.
The stronger the belief in conspiracy, the stronger cognitive
dissonance can be expected, and the results can be apparent in
attitudes and behavior. We only examined beliefs, and in this
field, cognitive dissonance can be resolved in two main ways:
CT beliefs can be reduced and the new information regarding
CT believers can be rejected. Considering the full sample,
this strategy reduced CT beliefs. However, when we examined
the effect of this condition among those who held strong vs.
relatively weak CT beliefs separately, we found no significant
difference between the effects of rational arguments: it was
effective in both groups. Further, examination is needed in order
to identify why ridiculing strategy did not have an overwhelming
effect.
Among the experimental manipulations, the empathetic
condition was the least effective. Previous studies found that
perspective taking can effectively reduce CT beliefs (van Prooijen
and van Dijk, 2014). In the present study, strengthening empathy
toward the object of the CT beliefs did not seem to reduce
CT beliefs effectively. Several reasons why we did not find
this strategy effective can be considered. First, empathy and
perspective taking can be considered as distinct constructs
(Davis, 1983). Second, unlike van Prooijen and van Dijk (2014),
the present study used CT beliefs with topics close to the
respondents’ everyday life (Hungary, EU, bankers, Jews); and
these were probably more embedded than stories about distant
events as in van Prooijen and van Dijk’s study. We suggest
that conspiracy beliefs can be more easily changed when they
have less prevalent anchors in the life of the studied group.
Consequently, more deeply rooted CT beliefs are harder to
change by enhancing empathy toward the CT’s object; however,
emphasizing perspective-taking can be more beneficial for this
purpose.
On the basis of these results, two belief changing strategies
appeared to be effective: the rational and the ridiculing ones.
From the perspective of the different theoretical backgrounds,
there are alternative explanations for these findings. On the
basis of the functional attitude theories (Katz, 1960), if someone
wishes to reduce CT beliefs, the informational and ego-defensive
functions of attitudes toward CTs could be equally employed in
communication strategy building. From the perspective of the
elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), both
central and peripheral paths can be equally effective, especially if
the peripheral one is more closely related to ridiculing those who
hold these beliefs than empathizing with the victims of CT beliefs.
Finally, the consistency theories (e.g., Abelson, 1968), in order
to reduce the acceptance of CT beliefs, appear to be effective to
create inconsistency between being a logical person (as a specific
part of positive self-concept) vs. the irrationality of CT believers
and between the informational content of the previous beliefs
vs. the new information regarding events or people related to
conspiracies.
Thanks to the rich literature regarding the links between
individual differences in terms of personality (Abalakina-
Paap and Stephan, 1999; Whitson and Galinsky, 2008; Swami
et al., 2011; Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013) and
values (Abalakina-Paap and Stephan, 1999; Swami et al., 2011;
Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013), we presumed
that individual differences could affect, to some extent, the
effectiveness of the three strategies. According to the results,
this is not the case. Individual differences in terms of Big Five
traits and social desirability did not influence the experimental
effects. Furthermore, very weak or non-significant links were
found between conspiracy theory related variables and individual
differences and these were not related to CT belief change.
There might be several reasons for these results: it is possible
that the effect of individual differences on CT beliefs is
smaller among Hungarians than in other countries. It is also
possible that we could not measure any effect of individual
differences on the acceptance of CTs with the specific CT
material used in the experiment. Finally, it is also possible
that other, longer or more sophisticated personality or social
desirability measures would better demonstrate the possible role
of individual differences. Contrary to individual differences,
situational variables influenced the belief in conspiracy theories
(e.g., the perceived competence and intelligence of the person
who argued against the CT, increased the effectiveness of the
belief change).
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The present study is not without limitations. The effect sizes
were not large. However, measuring the effectiveness of different
reasoning or convincing strategies is not easy. In the present
study, the number of arguments was balanced, but the length
of the audio recordings was different in the different conditions.
Further, studies should balance the number of arguments, their
length and pretest the effectiveness of each argument. Needless
to say that it is a time consuming task. If we consider the present
study as an intervention, it can first be said that this is not a wise
one, as direct and confronting strategies were used to convince
individuals regarding CT reduction. Second, this experiment
did not have the very solid theoretical background that a good
intervention requires. Third, this study only measured the short-
term effects of different CT reduction strategies. Fourth, it
targeted a general population instead of a specific subgroup of
individuals. Fifth, the timing of the experiment was not related
to a big CT-related scandal, which could have influenced the
effectiveness of the conditions.
Besides these numerous deficiencies, the present study shows
that rational arguments can reduce CT beliefs, while ridiculing
also appears to be somewhat effective. Future studies are
needed in order to explore the boundaries of these results. But,
after careful investigation of these conditions (culture, timing,
different groups with different characteristics, different speakers,
etc.), media campaigns can be designed and in collaboration with
competent public speakers, different CT reduction strategies can
be tested.
CONCLUSION
Despite the extensive knowledge about the harmful effects of
having CT beliefs, the reduction of CT beliefs with experimental
methods is a relatively neglected topic of scientific investigation.
In the present study, three convincing strategies were tested
in order to reduce CT beliefs: rational arguments, ridiculing
of CT believers, and expressing empathy toward the objects of
CT beliefs. Providing rational arguments was found as being
an effective strategy, along with providing ridiculing arguments,
which could also reduce CT beliefs. Only very weak, or even
non-significant links were found between conspiracy theory-
related variables and individual differences. Considering these
results and previous studies focusing on the benevolent effects
of analytic thinking in CT belief reduction, it can be assumed
that uncovering arguments regarding the logical inconsistencies
of CT beliefs can be an effective way to discredit them. Our
findings on the efficiency of rational argumentation go against
the mainstream of the communication literature and “common
wisdom,” as well as the current affective wave of social psychology
emphasizing that emotions constitute the most important factor
behind shaping beliefs and attitudes. Considering the modest
effect sizes, we assume that rationality has a bigger impact on
shaping (sometimes irrational) beliefs than previously expected,
given that in the current communication environment, people
are overloaded with emotional messages coming from ads,
political and social campaigns. Future studies should also
investigate the role of rationality and the “rationality heuristic”
in belief change.
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